Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
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Publication:844930
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.024zbMATH Open1197.91096OpenAlexW2097978174MaRDI QIDQ844930FDOQ844930
Authors: François Maniquet, Yves Sprumont 
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/06-2006-cah.pdf
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Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Cooperative production: A comparison of welfare bounds
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
- Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
- Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments
- Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
- Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
- Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
Cited In (15)
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
- The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
- Public good provision with constitutional constraint
- A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism
- Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
- Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
- Public goods provision: unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core
- Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
- Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
- Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
- On the origin of the WTA-WTP divergence in public good valuation
- Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
- Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula
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