Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.024MaRDI QIDQ844930zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors François Maniquet, Yves Sprumont

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/06-2006-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessincentive compatibilityserial ruleexcludable public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
• On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Cites work

• A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
• Cooperative production: A comparison of welfare bounds
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
• Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
• Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
• Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments

Cited in

(15)

• Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism
• Public good provision with constitutional constraint
• Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Public goods provision: unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
• Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
• On the origin of the WTA-WTP divergence in public good valuation
• Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
• Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula

This page was built for publication: Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q844930)