Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
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Publication:844930
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.024zbMath1197.91096OpenAlexW2097978174MaRDI QIDQ844930
Yves Sprumont, François Maniquet
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/06-2006-cah.pdf
Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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