The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy

DOI10.2307/1913951zbMATH Open0367.90046OpenAlexW2031589562MaRDI QIDQ4145378FDOQ4145378

Authors: Mamoru Kaneko 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913951

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (12)

• Proportional income taxes and cores in a public goods economy
• Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
• Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• Share equilibrium in local public good economies
• Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
• A friendly computable characteristic function
• The core coincides with the nucleolus allocations in a public goods economy with taxation
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Local public good equilibrium
• Ratio equilibrium in an economy with externalities
• Balanced environmental games

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