The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints

DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5zbMath1252.91010MaRDI QIDQ430898

Aymeric Lardon

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5

zbMATH Keywords

\(\gamma \)-core; balanced game; Cournot oligopoly TU-games; non-cooperative fairness; NP-value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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