The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
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Publication:430898
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5zbMath1252.91010OpenAlexW2027608955MaRDI QIDQ430898
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (13)
Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley ⋮ Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core ⋮ Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ Optimal deterrence of cooperation ⋮ Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores ⋮ On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies ⋮ Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games ⋮ Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability ⋮ A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities ⋮ COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES ⋮ The core of a strategic game ⋮ The core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies
Cites Work
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- The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
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