On the -core of asymmetric aggregative games

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09733-4zbMATH Open1437.91039OpenAlexW2901512389MaRDI QIDQ2188231FDOQ2188231

Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Publication date: 10 June 2020

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09733-4

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscooperative gamecoreaggregative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (2)

• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

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