Recommendations
Cites work
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
- Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
Cited in
(16)- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Time consistent cooperative solutions for multistage games with vector payoffs
- Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
- The core of a strategic game
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
- On the -core of asymmetric aggregative games
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- Overlapping climate clubs: self-enforcing R\&D networks to mitigate global warming
- Cooperative concurrent games
- On the strong -hybrid solution of an N-person game
- Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
- A friendly computable characteristic function
- Cooperative differential games with continuous updating using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Existence of solutions in variational relation problems without convexity
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