Coalitions, agreements and efficiency

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.012zbMath1256.91009OpenAlexW2010267089MaRDI QIDQ2455654

Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Licun Xue

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/articles/5q47rs66n

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyexternalitiescoalition formationagreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (24)

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ The gamma-core and coalition formation ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ A coalition formation value for games in partition function form ⋮ Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations ⋮ On stability of economic networks ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Competition and networks of collaboration ⋮ Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities ⋮ Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy ⋮ STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES ⋮ The coalition structure core is accessible ⋮ Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games ⋮ International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

Cites Work

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• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• N‐person games in partition function form

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