Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
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Publication:419404
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.11.003zbMATH Open1237.91030OpenAlexW2000287670MaRDI QIDQ419404FDOQ419404
Authors: Gerald Pech 
Publication date: 18 May 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.11.003
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Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
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- Equilibrium binding agreements
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- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
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- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
Cited In (6)
- Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
- Moderation of an ideological party
- Fraïssé limits in comma categories
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
- Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
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