Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.004zbMath1236.91060OpenAlexW3123337393MaRDI QIDQ719881

Jon X. Eguia

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

voting blocscoalition formationvoting ruleparty formationparty discipline

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability ⋮ The winner‐take‐all dilemma ⋮ A spatial theory of party formation ⋮ On the spatial representation of preference profiles ⋮ Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems ⋮ Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties ⋮ Reaching across the aisle to block reforms ⋮ Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Existence of a multicameral core
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• A model of political parties
• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• Executive Control and Legislative Success
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities
• On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
• N‐person games in partition function form