Publication:5433153

Publication date: 8 January 2008

cooperative games; equilibrium; blocking; cooperation; bargaining; coalition formation; noncooperation; irreversible agreements; reversible agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91A80: Applications of game theory

91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

91A35: Decision theory for games

Related Items

Competition and networks of collaboration, Privacy in Networks of Interacting Agents, Models of coalition or alliance formation, Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities, Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents, Bargaining for assembly, On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium, On the core of dynamic cooperative games, A spatial theory of party formation, The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification, Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions, Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria, Dynamic coalitional equilibrium, Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games, Externalities, potential, value and consistency, Information systems in modeling interactive computations on granules, Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities, Interactive information systems: toward perception based computing, Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation, Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application, Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution, Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model, Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core, Coalition formation in games without side payments, Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations, Core existence in vertically differentiated markets, A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model, Constitutions and groups, Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model, Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies, Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining, Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities, Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers, Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures, Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities, The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration, Costless delay in negotiations, Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals, Agency equilibrium, Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies, Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size, An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions, Partial cooperative equilibria: existence and characterization, Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets, Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games, Observability and endogenous organizations, Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation, Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games, Paths to stability for overlapping group structures, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining, Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences, A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority, Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks, Structural stability of coalitions: a formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors, Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation