A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
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Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Decision theory for games (91A35) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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