Core existence in vertically differentiated markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.09.032MaRDI QIDQ1668624zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Gabszewicz, Marco A. Marini, Ornella Tarola

Publication date 29 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11573/893569

zbMATH Keywords

coalition stabilitycoregames with externalitiesgrand coalitionpartition function gamesprice collusionvertically differentiated markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
• Core equivalence with differentiated commodities
• The core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility
• Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities
• Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models.

Cites work

• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• Monopoly and product quality
• N‐person games in partition function form
• Price competition, quality and income disparities

Cited in

(10)

• The core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility
• The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: the case of differentiated retailers
• On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
• Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products
• Cartel formation with quality differentiation
• Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability
• Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers
• Multimarket Contact in Vertically Related Markets
• Monopoly, multi-product quality, consumer heterogeneity, and market segmentation
• Formation of an ordered constrained coalition in Cournot oligopoly setting with precedence constraints

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