Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.009zbMath1271.91017OpenAlexW2144500880MaRDI QIDQ2462284

Isa E. Hafalir

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueimplementationexternalitiescoalition formationpartition function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (32)

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach ⋮ The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities ⋮ Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ On convexity in cooperative games with externalities ⋮ Core existence in vertically differentiated markets ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ Fair division in the presence of externalities ⋮ The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game ⋮ The value of cooperation in interregional transmission planning: a noncooperative equilibrium model approach ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies ⋮ Consistency and the core in games with externalities ⋮ Marginality and convexity in partition function form games ⋮ Nash bargaining solution under externalities ⋮ Games in sequencing situations with externalities ⋮ A dynamic bargaining game with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities ⋮ COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES ⋮ The core of a strategic game ⋮ Coalition formation among farsighted agents ⋮ Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games ⋮ A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities ⋮ The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities ⋮ TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES?

Cites Work

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• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
• Values of games in partition function form
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Cores of convex games
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• N‐person games in partition function form
• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

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