Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
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Publication:2021804
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00721-5zbMath1461.91183OpenAlexW3036419111MaRDI QIDQ2021804
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00721-5
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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