Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00721-5zbMath1461.91183OpenAlexW3036419111MaRDI QIDQ2021804

Parkash Chander

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00721-5

zbMATH Keywords

coreoligopolymonopolycartelpartition function game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• The gamma-core and coalition formation
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
• A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
• The core of a strategic game
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Game Theory and Climate Change
• The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities
• Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
• N‐person games in partition function form