Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00721-5MaRDI QIDQ2021804zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Chander

Publication date 27 April 2021

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00721-5

zbMATH Keywords

cartelcoremonopolyoligopolypartition function game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Game theory and climate change
• Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795166 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999 (Why is no real title available?)
• N‐person games in partition function form
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The core of a strategic game
• The core of aggregative cooperative games with externalities
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The gamma-core and coalition formation
• The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game

Cited in

(4)

• On the -core of asymmetric aggregative games
• The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
• Non-cooperative representations of cooperative games
• Formation of an ordered constrained coalition in Cournot oligopoly setting with precedence constraints

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