The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities

DOI10.1515/bejte-2014-0054zbMath1375.91018OpenAlexW2294861466MaRDI QIDQ4588494

Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-1/bejte-2014-0054/bejte-2014-0054.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gameexternalitiesaggregative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities ⋮ The core of a strategic game

Cites Work

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• A recursive core for partition function form games
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
• Aggregate comparative statics
• COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

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