Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
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Publication:1757811
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005zbMath1250.91060OpenAlexW2137033099MaRDI QIDQ1757811
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005
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