Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
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Publication:4614957
DOI10.3982/ECTA12340zbMath1420.91227OpenAlexW1763462861MaRDI QIDQ4614957
Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Philip J. Reny
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12340
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