Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2021.10.050MaRDI QIDQ2670588zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco Biancalani, Giorgio Gnecco, Massimo Riccaboni

Publication date 11 March 2022

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.050

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationlinear programmingpricingcontract theoryprice-volume agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3746761 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1774199 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
• A multiscale decision theory analysis for revenue sharing in three-stage supply chains
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• DEA-based yardstick competition: The optimality of best practice regulation
• Discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price-sensitive demand.
• Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
• Multiple-task and multiple-agent models: Incentive contracts and an application to point pollution control
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
• The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields

Cited in

(2)

• Block sourcing plus
• Promotion and Leakage under a Pharmaceutical Price-Volume Agreement

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