Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.050zbMath1495.91065MaRDI QIDQ2670588

Francesco Biancalani, Giorgio Gnecco, Massimo Riccaboni

Publication date: 11 March 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.050

zbMATH Keywords

optimization; linear programming; contract theory; pricing; price-volume agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B41: Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection)

91B43: Principal-agent models

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Cites Work

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