Pricing of platforms in two-sided markets with heterogeneous agents and limited market size
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Publication:2331482
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(21)- Armstrong meets Rochet-Tirole: on the equivalence of different pricing structures in two-sided markets
- Quality screening and information disclosure in two-sided markets
- A two-sided market model of optimal price structure for instant messenger
- Market shares and profits in two-sided markets
- The impact of strategic agents in two-sided markets
- Pricing in two-sided markets on the plain with different agent types
- Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts
- Estimating network effects in two-sided markets without data on prices and quantities
- Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
- Optimum positioning of network platforms on a plane
- Pricing models in two-sided markets with asymmetric conditions
- Platform pricing in mixed two-sided markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6971594 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimum positioning of network platforms on a plane
- Platform competition with endogenous homing
- Revenue from matching platforms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7108323 (Why is no real title available?)
- Two-sided platform's performance investment and pricing
- Pricing for services with cross-segment externalities, capacity constraints, and competition
- Auctions in a two-sided network: the market for meal voucher services
- The economics of platforms in a Walrasian framework
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