Quality screening and information disclosure in two-sided markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.07.034zbMATH Open1397.91274OpenAlexW2883353679WikidataQ129461701 ScholiaQ129461701MaRDI QIDQ1788015FDOQ1788015

Authors: Jin Wang 

Publication date: 8 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.034

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zbMATH Keywords

multiple thresholdstwo-sided marketminimum thresholdquality screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (6)

• Quality assurance competition strategy under B2C platform
• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• Inducing information transparency: the roles of gray market and dual-channel
• Strategic Release of Information in Platforms: Entry, Competition, and Welfare
• Information management and pricing in platform markets
• Quality selection in two-sided markets: a constrained price discrimination approach

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