Competitive screening under heterogeneous information

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDY072OpenAlexW634773259WikidataQ128751926 ScholiaQ128751926MaRDI QIDQ5028528FDOQ5028528

Authors: Daniel F. Garrett, Renato Gomes, Lucas Maestri 

Publication date: 10 February 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26461/1/ggm_current.pdf

Recommendations

• Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city
• Oligopolistic competition in price and quality
• Sequential screening
• Price competition and consumer externalities in a vertically differentiated duopoly with information disparities
• Screening in vertical oligopolies

zbMATH Keywords

screeningcompetitionprice discriminationadverse selectionheterogeneous information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (9)

• Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Quality screening and information disclosure in two-sided markets
• Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
• The demand for information services and the market structure.
• Sequential screening
• On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
• Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city
• Screening in vertical oligopolies

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