Sequential Screening

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Publication:2707933

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00150zbMath0977.91028OpenAlexW4234284606MaRDI QIDQ2707933

Pascal Courty, Hao Li

Publication date: 4 April 2001

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00150




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