Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
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Publication:2013372
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Cites work
- Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
- Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist
- Discounted Dynamic Programming
- Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment
- Ironing in Dynamic Revenue Management: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions
- Monopoly and product quality
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- Search deterrence
- Sequential screening
Cited in
(7)- Dynamic utility-based good deal bounds
- Progressive participation
- Sequential auctions and auction revenue
- Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival
- Threshold mechanisms for dynamic procurement with abandonment
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