Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
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Publication:2013372
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.005zbMATH Open1393.91080OpenAlexW2626278895MaRDI QIDQ2013372FDOQ2013372
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/garrett/final_geb_dynamic_arrivals.pdf
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Cites Work
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