Threshold mechanisms for dynamic procurement with abandonment

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_22MaRDI QIDQ6546307zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ali Khodabakhsh, E. Nikolova, E. Pountourakis, Jimmy Horn

Publication date 29 May 2024

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsprocurementthreshold mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Budget feasible procurement auctions
• Procurement auctions with losses
• Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids
• On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions

Cites work

• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
• Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System
• Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained

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