Threshold mechanisms for dynamic procurement with abandonment

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_22zbMATH Open1537.91115MaRDI QIDQ6546307FDOQ6546307

Authors: Ali Khodabakhsh, E. Nikolova, E. Pountourakis, Jimmy Horn 

Publication date: 29 May 2024

Recommendations

• Budget feasible procurement auctions
• Procurement auctions with losses
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• On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsprocurementthreshold mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System
• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values

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