A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17MaRDI QIDQ5459983zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 2 May 2008

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Level Algorithm for Preemptive Scheduling
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• AdWords and generalized online matching
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• Market equilibrium via a primal-dual algorithm for a convex program
• On the complexity of equilibria
• Optimization and Approximation in Deterministic Sequencing and Scheduling: a Survey
• Preemptive Scheduling of Uniform Processor Systems
• Sponsored search auctions

Cited in

(12)

• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
• Threshold mechanisms for dynamic procurement with abandonment
• Balanced allocation mechanism: an optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions
• Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Truthful auction for CPU time slots
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7051298 (Why is no real title available?)
• Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes
• Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms
• On the Hardness of Truthful Online Auctions with Multidimensional Constraints
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders

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