Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
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Publication:1753496
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.031zbMATH Open1403.91169OpenAlexW2562618346MaRDI QIDQ1753496FDOQ1753496
Authors: Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler 
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.031
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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Cited In (6)
- Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
- The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders
- A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
- Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
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