Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.031MaRDI QIDQ1753496zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.031

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryauctions/biddingapproximation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(6)

• The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives
• Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
• Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
• Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders
• A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
• Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations

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