Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
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Publication:1753496
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.031zbMath1403.91169OpenAlexW2562618346MaRDI QIDQ1753496
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.031
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
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