Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies

DOI10.1145/1462153.1462157MaRDI QIDQ3452198zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov

Publication date 11 November 2015

Published in Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1462153.1462157

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesmechanism designcombinatorial auctionsundominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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Cited in

(11)

• Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
• On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments
• Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
• Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
• Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
• Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
• Mechanism design with approximate valuations

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