Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
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Publication:2345944
DOI10.1007/s00453-013-9854-4zbMath1311.91109OpenAlexW2028957280MaRDI QIDQ2345944
Publication date: 21 May 2015
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-013-9854-4
competitive analysisprimal-dual analysisincentive compatible mechanismmulti-unit combinatorial auctions
Related Items (2)
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets ⋮ Welfare maximization with production costs: a primal dual approach
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