scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297728

zbMath1288.91099MaRDI QIDQ5417646

Hu Fu, Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Michael Schapira, Chris Umans, Yaron Singer, Elchanan Mossel, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 22 May 2014

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (10)

Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations ⋮ Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the Vapnik--Chervonenkis Dimension ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design ⋮ Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders ⋮ Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach

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