Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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Publication:2516249
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.007zbMath1318.91090arXiv1109.1055MaRDI QIDQ2516249
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1055
incentive compatibility; algorithmic mechanism design; combinatorial auctions; submodular valuations
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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