From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993657zbMath1288.91103OpenAlexW2169319812MaRDI QIDQ5419084

Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan, Shaddin Dughmi

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993657

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (11)

The Limitations of Optimization from Samples ⋮ Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Recognizing Coverage Functions ⋮ Matroid rank functions and discrete concavity ⋮ A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding ⋮ Welfare maximization with production costs: a primal dual approach ⋮ Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders

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