From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms, toward optimal combinatorial auctions
DOI10.1145/1993636.1993657zbMATH Open1288.91103OpenAlexW2169319812MaRDI QIDQ5419084FDOQ5419084
Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan 
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993657
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Linear programming (90C05) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Welfare economics (91B15)
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