From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms
DOI10.1145/1993636.1993657zbMATH Open1288.91103OpenAlexW2169319812MaRDI QIDQ5419084FDOQ5419084
Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan, Shaddin Dughmi
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993657
Linear programming (90C05) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cited In (19)
- A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game
- Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions
- Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries
- Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
- Recognizing Coverage Functions
- The Limitations of Optimization from Samples
- Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy
- Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design
- Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding
- Welfare maximization with production costs: a primal dual approach
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
- Matroid rank functions and discrete concavity
- A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
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