A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2017.12.029zbMath1391.91129OpenAlexW2791731338WikidataQ130164797 ScholiaQ130164797MaRDI QIDQ1752443

Guy Kortsarz, Hossein Esfandiari

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2017.12.029

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designgraph matchingalmost truthfulkidney exchange gamelow risk mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• A Better Bound on the Variance
• A Simple Parallel Algorithm for the Maximal Independent Set Problem
• A dynamic model of barter exchange
• From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms

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