Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.008zbMath1318.91143OpenAlexW1989795702MaRDI QIDQ2347782

Itai Ashlagi, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116372

zbMATH Keywords

kidney exchangeapproximate mechanisms without money

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (16)

Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks ⋮ Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete ⋮ Efficiency and Budget Balance ⋮ Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange ⋮ Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line ⋮ Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game ⋮ A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game ⋮ Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain ⋮ Efficient stabilization of cooperative matching games ⋮ Algorithms for strategyproof classification ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes ⋮ Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching ⋮ A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program ⋮ Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Kidney Exchange
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
• MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

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