Algorithms for strategyproof classification
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1761283
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2012.03.008zbMath1251.91022MaRDI QIDQ1761283
Ariel D. Procaccia, Reshef Meir, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Publication date: 15 November 2012
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2012.03.008
Related Items
Parametric Prediction from Parametric Agents, Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation, Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games, Representative Committees of Peers, Strategyproof facility location with limited locations, On incentive-compatible estimators
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Walking in circles
- The learnability of voting rules
- Aggregation of binary evaluations
- Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations
- Aggregation of equivalence relations
- On the use of ordered sets in problems of comparison and consensus of classifications
- On the theory of aggregation
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
- PAC learning with nasty noise.
- Incentive compatible regression learning
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Scheduling without Payments
- Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
- A theory of the learnable
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the Uniform Convergence of Relative Frequencies of Events to Their Probabilities
