On the theory of aggregation
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Publication:1219824
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(75)90062-9zbMath0311.90008OpenAlexW2095567645MaRDI QIDQ1219824
Publication date: 1975
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90062-9
Related Items (46)
On anonymous and weighted voting systems ⋮ Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue ⋮ Aggregation of equivalence relations ⋮ Algebraic aggregation theory ⋮ A generalised model of judgment aggregation ⋮ Strategy-proof partitioning ⋮ The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review ⋮ Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices ⋮ Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem ⋮ The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory ⋮ Abstract aggregation functions and social choice ⋮ Scoring rules for judgment aggregation ⋮ Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others ⋮ Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules ⋮ Generalized Rawlsianism ⋮ Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation ⋮ The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Aggregation of non-binary evaluations ⋮ Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations ⋮ Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule ⋮ Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation ⋮ Judgment aggregation without full rationality ⋮ A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation ⋮ Judgment aggregation in search for the truth ⋮ Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation ⋮ A Geometric Approach to Paradoxes of Majority Voting: From Anscombe’s Paradox to the Discursive Dilemma with Saari and Nurmi ⋮ Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem ⋮ Algorithms for strategyproof classification ⋮ Introduction to judgment aggregation ⋮ Abstract Arrowian aggregation ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations ⋮ Majority voting on restricted domains ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions ⋮ The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems ⋮ Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation ⋮ Semiorders and collective choice ⋮ An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization ⋮ Self-designation and group allocation ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
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