Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0757-8zbMath1302.91080OpenAlexW2075495223WikidataQ59324925 ScholiaQ59324925MaRDI QIDQ404749

Franz Dietrich

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0757-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

The logic of group decisions: judgment aggregation ⋮ Logic and majority voting ⋮ Merging existential rules programs in multi-agent contexts through credibility accrual ⋮ The median rule in judgement aggregation ⋮ A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule ⋮ Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation ⋮ Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure ⋮ Social choice rules driven by propositional logic ⋮ The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences ⋮ Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach

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