Social Choice Scoring Functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4404102
DOI10.1137/0128067zbMath0277.92007OpenAlexW2125453995MaRDI QIDQ4404102
Publication date: 1975
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0128067
Related Items
A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting ⋮ New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness ⋮ Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization ⋮ Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance ⋮ Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited ⋮ A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ The socially acceptable scoring rule ⋮ Revealed votes ⋮ Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron ⋮ Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting ⋮ The learnability of voting rules ⋮ Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules ⋮ The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited ⋮ A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings ⋮ A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ A decomposition of strategy-proofness ⋮ Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems ⋮ Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox ⋮ Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? ⋮ A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules ⋮ Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ A new characterization of simple majority ⋮ Weighted scoring committees ⋮ Variable-population voting rules ⋮ Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity ⋮ Group support and top-heavy rules ⋮ A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings ⋮ Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Rational status quo ⋮ Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule ⋮ Distance rationalization of voting rules ⋮ Scoring rules for judgment aggregation ⋮ Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view ⋮ Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules ⋮ Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension ⋮ On the Indicator Plurality Function ⋮ A general scoring rule ⋮ Social choice for bliss-point problems ⋮ Choice and individual welfare ⋮ Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting ⋮ The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules ⋮ Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate ⋮ Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations ⋮ Formal utilitarianism and range voting ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Representation in majority tournaments ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ The Efron dice voting system ⋮ Voting rules as statistical estimators ⋮ Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules ⋮ Characterizations of the plurality function ⋮ Generalized Condorcet winners ⋮ Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ On the indicator function of the plurality function ⋮ Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure ⋮ Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule ⋮ Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency ⋮ Rank-based choice correspondences ⋮ Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters ⋮ Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules ⋮ Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights ⋮ Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections ⋮ Consensus sequences based on plurality rule ⋮ Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules ⋮ The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences ⋮ Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice ⋮ A characterization of the plurality rule ⋮ Utility in case-based decision theory ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions ⋮ Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting ⋮ A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule ⋮ The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited ⋮ Group decisions from individual rankings: the Borda-Condorcet rule ⋮ Categorization generated by extended prototypes -- an axiomatic approach ⋮ Weighted committee games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof ⋮ Extending Condorcet's rule ⋮ Size approval voting ⋮ Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ How to choose a fair delegation? ⋮ Inductive inference with incompleteness ⋮ Majority rule in the absence of a majority ⋮ Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency ⋮ Utilitarianism without individual utilities ⋮ Consensus rules for committee elections ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Research in decision theory: A personal perspective ⋮ On the information about individual utilities used in social choice ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules ⋮ Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations ⋮ Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
This page was built for publication: Social Choice Scoring Functions
