Rank-based choice correspondences
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Publication:673207
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00877-4zbMATH Open0879.90011OpenAlexW2078671229MaRDI QIDQ673207FDOQ673207
Publication date: 28 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00877-4
Cites Work
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Geometry of voting
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
Cited In (9)
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- A rank-based selection with cardinal payoffs and a cost of choice
- Generalizing the concept of binary choice systems induced by rankings: One way of probabilizing deterministic measurement structures
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Ranking responses in multiple-choice questions
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules
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