Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
- Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Geometry of voting
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
Cited in
(9)- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- A rank-based selection with cardinal payoffs and a cost of choice
- Generalizing the concept of binary choice systems induced by rankings: One way of probabilizing deterministic measurement structures
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Ranking responses in multiple-choice questions
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
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