Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
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Publication:904832
DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0881-8zbMATH Open1341.91061arXiv1005.4877OpenAlexW1999188199MaRDI QIDQ904832FDOQ904832
Authors: Felix Brandt 
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former are preferred to all elements of the latter. It is shown that set-monotonicity---a new variant of Maskin-monotonicity---implies Kelly-strategyproofness in comprehensive subdomains of the linear domain. Interestingly, there are a handful of appealing Condorcet extensions---such as the top cycle, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set---that satisfy set-monotonicity even in the unrestricted linear domain, thereby answering questions raised independently by Barber`a (1977) and Kelly (1977).
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.4877
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