Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
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Cites work
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Cited in
(14)- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- Oligarchy for social choice correspondences and strategy-proofness
- Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- A strategic aspect of the strong positive association condition
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
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