Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
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Publication:1927884
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017zbMath1254.91127OpenAlexW1995758881MaRDI QIDQ1927884
Publication date: 2 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017
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Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
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- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures