The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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Publication:1255868
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90140-5zbMath0402.90004OpenAlexW2066849158MaRDI QIDQ1255868
Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Eitan Muller
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90140-5
VotingProfilesStrategy-ProofnessCitizens SovereigntyEfficient Series Strong Positive AssociationIncoherent Frequency-Shift Keyed SystemsRepresentation of a Band-Limited Gaussian Process. Nondictatorship
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