On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2244426
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9zbMath1475.91079OpenAlexW3090824287MaRDI QIDQ2244426
Publication date: 12 November 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22303
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- On the tournament equilibrium set
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Finite alternating-move arbitration schemes and the equal area solution
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Choosing from a tournament
- Implementation via backward induction
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
This page was built for publication: On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
