Computational implementation

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00282-3MaRDI QIDQ6156322zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/111498

zbMATH Keywords

computationNash implementationMaskin monotonicitymaximal domainbehavioral implementationconsistent collections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A crash course in implementation theory
• A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms
• A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Computation and Complexity in Economic Behavior and Organization
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Implementation via rights structures
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation with little communication
• Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
• On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Strategically simple mechanisms
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

Cited in

(4)

• Behavioral strong implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Exact implementation
• Implementation with a sympathizer

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