Computational implementation

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00282-3MaRDI QIDQ6156322zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/111498

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral implementationcomputationconsistent collectionsMaskin monotonicitymaximal domainNash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms
• A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Computation and Complexity in Economic Behavior and Organization
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation via rights structures
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with little communication
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
• On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Strategically simple mechanisms
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Cited in

(4)

• Exact implementation
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

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