Computational implementation

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00282-3zbMATH Open1518.91038OpenAlexW4206257358MaRDI QIDQ6156322FDOQ6156322

Authors: Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran 

Publication date: 13 June 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/111498

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zbMATH Keywords

computationNash implementationMaskin monotonicitymaximal domainbehavioral implementationconsistent collections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A crash course in implementation theory
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
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• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Computation and Complexity in Economic Behavior and Organization
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms
• Implementation via rights structures
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Strategically Simple Mechanisms
• Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
• On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
• Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
• Nash implementation with little communication

Cited In (4)

• Behavioral strong implementation
• Exact implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Implementation with a sympathizer

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