Computational implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6156322
DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3zbMath1518.91038MaRDI QIDQ6156322
Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/111498
computation; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity; maximal domain; behavioral implementation; consistent collections
91B03: Mechanism design theory
Related Items
Behavioral strong implementation, Behavioral implementation under incomplete information, Implementation with a sympathizer
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