Implementation via rights structures

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.04.009MaRDI QIDQ1757583zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Semih Koray, Kemal Yıldız

Publication date 15 January 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49904

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityNash equilibriumimplementationsocial choice rulerights structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Constitutional implementation.

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Constitutional implementation.
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation via rights structures
• Implementation with evidence
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(14)

• Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Implementation via rights structures
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
• Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
• Computational implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray

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