Implementation via rights structures
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Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Constitutional implementation.
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation via rights structures
- Implementation with evidence
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(17)- Implementation via rights structures
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Computational implementation
- Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of Michel Grabisch
- The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
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