Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design

DOI10.2307/2297639zbMath0605.90012MaRDI QIDQ3743039

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 1986

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5cf1a49ed52d5aee1808a54ba6847d0ba50ed215

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent model; adverse selection; implementation of social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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