Persuasion and dynamic communication

DOI10.3982/TE683zbMATH Open1395.91069MaRDI QIDQ4585998FDOQ4585998

Itai Sher

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationevidencecommitmentcredibilitymaximum flow problemoptimal persuasion rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Maximal Flow Through a Network
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• Maximal Closure of a Graph and Applications to Combinatorial Problems
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
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• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
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• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Implementation with partial provability
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Implementation with partial verification
• Strategic argumentation
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementation with evidence
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

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