Persuasion and dynamic communication
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Publication:4585998
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Computational Complexity
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
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- Disclosures and Asset Returns
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation with partial provability
- Implementation with partial verification
- Long Cheap Talk
- Maximal Closure of a Graph and Applications to Combinatorial Problems
- Maximal Flow Through a Network
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
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- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic argumentation
- The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Cited in
(15)- Implementation with evidence
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Influence modeling: mathematical programming representations of persuasion under either risk or uncertainty
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2031019 (Why is no real title available?)
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
- A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
- Dynamic persuasion
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
- Persuasion and receiver's news
- Persuasion as a contest
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms
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