Persuasion and dynamic communication
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Publication:4585998
DOI10.3982/TE683zbMATH Open1395.91069MaRDI QIDQ4585998FDOQ4585998
Authors: Itai Sher 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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Cited In (15)
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Dynamic persuasion
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Implementation with evidence
- Persuasion as a contest
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms
- Persuasion and receiver's news
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
- Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
- A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
- Influence modeling: mathematical programming representations of persuasion under either risk or uncertainty
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