Persuasion and dynamic communication
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Publication:4585998
DOI10.3982/TE683zbMath1395.91069MaRDI QIDQ4585998
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms
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