Strategic argumentation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.05.017MaRDI QIDQ634508zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wioletta Dziuda

Publication date 16 August 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017

zbMATH Keywords

argumentationdisclosure gamesexpert advicepersuasionstrategic communicationtwo-sided messages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Optimal Statistical Decisions
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(22)

• Dynamic persuasion
• Information acquisition and the value of bad news
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Balance of opinions in expert panels
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Public communication with externalities
• Pathways of persuasion
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Expert panels with selective investigation
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7599965 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747923 (Why is no real title available?)
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Competitive capture of public opinion
• Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
• Goal-hiding information-seeking dialogues: a formal framework
• Communication and standoff
• Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships

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