Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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Publication:5477767
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00336zbMath1137.91329OpenAlexW2040570331MaRDI QIDQ5477767
Publication date: 29 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00336
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