Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.003zbMATH Open1409.91051OpenAlexW3122886225MaRDI QIDQ523488FDOQ523488

Authors: Eric Schmidbauer 

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.003

Recommendations

• Competitive cheap talk
• Comparative cheap talk
• A model of expertise
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zbMATH Keywords

competitioncheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Competitive cheap talk
• A model of expertise
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Comparative cheap talk
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Potential competition in preemption games
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search

Cited In (4)

• Competitive cheap talk
• Comparative cheap talk
• Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability
• Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases

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