Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.003MaRDI QIDQ523488zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Schmidbauer

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

competitioncheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Competitive cheap talk
• Comparative cheap talk
• A model of expertise
• Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Cites work

• A Theory of Credibility
• A model of expertise
• Comparative cheap talk
• Competitive cheap talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Potential competition in preemption games
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(4)

• Competitive cheap talk
• Comparative cheap talk
• Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability
• Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases

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