Specialization and partisanship in committee search
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Publication:4586091
DOI10.3982/TE1292zbMATH Open1395.91124MaRDI QIDQ4586091FDOQ4586091
Authors: Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
- Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
- Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Social influence in committee deliberation
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
- Committee design with endogenous participation
- Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
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