Specialization and partisanship in committee search

DOI10.3982/TE1292MaRDI QIDQ4586091zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1292

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommittee searchinterdependent valuespartisanshipspecialization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10)

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Cited in

(13)

• Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
• Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
• On the drawbacks of large committees
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
• Committee design with endogenous participation
• The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
• Social influence in committee deliberation
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Political brinkmanship and compromise
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms

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