Specialization and partisanship in committee search

DOI10.3982/TE1292MaRDI QIDQ4586091zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationspecializationinterdependent valuespartisanshipcommittee search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10)

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Cited in

(12)

• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
• On the drawbacks of large committees
• Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
• The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
• Social influence in committee deliberation
• Committee design with endogenous participation
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

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