On the drawbacks of large committees
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Publication:2398198
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6zbMath1398.91233OpenAlexW3122843702MaRDI QIDQ2398198
Publication date: 15 August 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6
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